The Failings of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq by Michael Wahid Hanna

Michael Wahid Hanna
Published Wednesday December 24, 2008

In May 2008 I traveled to Baghdad with Joseph Logan, Iraq researcher for Human Rights Watch, to undertake a research project on Iraq’s flagship criminal justice institution, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI). The court was established by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003, and it was granted nationwide jurisdiction with a mandate to focus on terrorism and the most serious security-related cases within the framework of Iraqi criminal law. The court also hears the cases of a number of detainees referred by the U.S. military.

During our time in Baghdad we attended more than 70 investigative hearings and five trials involving 17 defendants, and we conducted extensive interviews with Iraqi judges, officials, lawyers, defendants, and detainees. We also met with U.S. military and embassy officials. The research was made possible by the high level of cooperation we received from Iraqi judicial officials and judges, who allowed us unfettered access to investigative hearings and trials and also allowed us to interview detainees. In fact, many of the Iraqi judges we met were forthright in acknowledging the failings we brought up in our discussions, and, in many instances, this was reflected in the numerous cases that were dismissed due to credible allegations of torture and coercion or serious indications of the misuse of secret informants.

Based upon our research we concluded that the CCCI was failing to meet basic international fair trial and due process standards. These findings, in addition to a series of recommendations, were included in the Human Rights Watch report, “The Quality of Justice: Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” which was released on December 15, 2008 here

The report documents how detainees in Iraq face serious delays in being brought before a judge and hearing the charges against them, oftentimes waiting for months and, in some cases, for years. These delays are compounded by the nature of the defense offered due to the fact that defense counsel typically had little or no access to detainees or their case files prior to hearings. In addition, an active defense bar, particularly with respect to volunteer lawyers, has yet to develop within the Iraqi legal culture, and no volunteer lawyers offered any semblance of an active defense.

The report also documents the overwhelming reliance on confessions - many of which are likely to have been the result of torture and coercion - and evidence obtained from secret informants. Interviews with detainees and court testimony indicate that abuse in initial detention and during interrogation by police and security forces was still widespread.

The basic flaws of the system are aggravated by security problems and lack of resources/capacity. The CCCI has also been plagued with heavy caseloads, which spiked due to the mass arrests in connection with U.S. and Iraqi military operations during the surge.

The recently concluded U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, which will come into effect on January 1, 2009, will have profound implications for the relationship between U.S. military forces and the Iraqi government. The nature of the day-to-day U.S.-Iraqi relationship has not yet been fully defined and how the security pact will be implemented in detail is still unclear. However, based upon the SOFA, U.S. forces will be obligated to turn over the approximately 15,000 detainees that remain in U.S. military detention. How these detainees will be dealt with will offer an early indication as to the near-term future of U.S.-Iraqi relations as U.S. forces begin drawing down.

Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna on December 24, 2008 in International Affairs